

# HANDBOOK

No. 05-23

July 05

## Joint IED Defeat Task Force

## Counter IED

*Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350

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## Foreword

This handbook is part of the Army's effort to prepare forces for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been used extensively against coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thousands of IED events have been reported in the Iraqi theater. Roadside bombs, car bombs, and booby traps are nothing new to war, but they have never appeared in the numbers seen in Iraq.

While the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) discussed in this handbook are based on extensive combat experience and field work, nothing can substitute for good tactical judgment based upon your situation. Soldiers and leaders must consider rules of engagement (ROE), commander's guidance and intent, your mission, and your orders before acting. Not all units will have the capability to execute all of the recommendations of this handbook; however, a majority are applicable to every coalition force (CF) member in theater.

**LAWRENCE H. SAUL**

**COL, FA**

**Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned**

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<b>CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED</b>	
<b>Director</b>	<b>Colonel Lawrence H. Saul</b>
<b>Managing Editor</b>	<b>Dr. Lon Seglie</b>
<b>Joint IED Defeat Task Force</b>	<b>Brigadier General Joseph L. Votel, Director</b> <b>Major Don J. McDannald,</b> <b>Chief of Training and Lessons Learned</b> <b>Michael Stewart,</b> <b>Senior Analyst Training Advisory Team</b> <b>Iraq Field Team</b> <b>Afghanistan Field Team</b> <b>Training Advisory Team</b>
<b>Editor</b>	<b>Valerie Tystad</b>
<b>Graphic Artist</b>	<b>Mark Osterholm</b>

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Fax: DSN 552-4387; Commercial (913) 684-4387

E-mail Address: [callrfi@leavenworth.army.mil](mailto:callrfi@leavenworth.army.mil)

Web Site: <http://call.army.mil>

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## Introduction

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) account for the majority of wounded and killed Soldiers in the current fight. For this reason, it is important to consider some basic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that allow you to survive in an IED environment. Knowing what to look for and where to look is a start point. Understanding how to move, either as part of a patrol or resupply element, gives you an edge on the battlefield.

One important point to remember is that IEDs are not the enemy. The people using IEDs are the enemy. You can defeat the insurgents that employ IEDs by being observant, by watching for IED indicators, and by killing or capturing those responsible for the IEDs, whether it is the emplacer, trigger man, bomb maker, or financier.

Counter IED operations involve several skill sets:

- Soldiers need to be aware of IED characteristics. Understanding the enemy's basic techniques, knowing basic IED indicators, and identifying IED components allow Soldiers to recognize potential IEDs before they can be used against them.
- Soldiers need to be proficient at movement in an IED environment, both on patrols and in convoys; route clearing, performed by various units in theater, contributes to coalition freedom of movement.
- Soldiers need to take the fight to the enemy who uses IEDs by employing basic tactics and techniques to target IED makers and emplacers.

**Caution:** The TTP described in this handbook were current as of the date of publication. The situation in theater changes rapidly. While preparing for deployment, you should ask your S2 for updates, and you can check the CALL and the Joint IED Defeat Task Force Web sites for the most current IED information.

While deployed, you can contact the Joint IED Task Force Field Team in Iraq or Afghanistan for up-to-date developments.

CALL: <http://call.army.smil.mil/>

JIEDD-TF: <http://www.portal.inscom.army.smil.mil/jieddtf/default.aspx>



## Chapter 1

### The Enemy

“The enemy is always watching, so be careful.” Everyone who has been in the military for more than a couple days has had the lesson drilled into them. This has never been as true as it is now. Believe it—the enemy is watching you all the time. When you move, when you speak, and when you drive, you should assume the enemy will collect information about your unit.

You and your unit should do everything you can to avoid setting patterns. The enemy needs a time and a place in order to attack you; setting a pattern gives him that opportunity. Do not allow yourself to get sucked into the fatal tendency of complacency. The enemy is **ALWAYS** watching.

Many Iraqis are glad to have coalition forces in their country. They realize that we are there to create a secure and stable environment for them. Unfortunately, other groups, ranging from foreign terrorists to unemployed Iraqis, will do anything in their power to hurt coalition efforts. Why does the enemy use improvised explosive devices (IEDs)? It suits this particular enemy’s style, and the materials used in IED construction are readily available.

IED makers range from the very sophisticated to the very stupid. Some bomb makers employ advanced electronics in their detonation devices, or they build large, well-concealed IEDs. The bolder among this type of insurgent will follow up on an IED attack with additional IEDs, small arms fire, indirect fire, or rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). Other IED makers use crude techniques; some manage to blow themselves up during the manufacture or emplacement of the device. Regardless of the device’s construction, if properly employed, all IEDs can inflict injuries on coalition forces (CF) or Iraqi civilians.

Currently, the enemy prefers to employ standoff techniques, using displaced observation and firing points for IEDs. More complex attacks may use an IED detonation to initiate contact followed by direct or indirect fires. Generally, the enemy will not assault through the ambush zone, choosing instead to exfiltrate after setting off the IED.

The enemy in Iraq uses a modified cell structure. Cells can be loosely organized around family ties and tribal associations, or they can have a well thought-out structure with rigid separation between cell members and precise duties. Specifics vary by region.

### Notional Cell Structure

This following example of an insurgent cell represents the duties and linkages of its members.




Figure 1-1: Notional cell structure

You should collect information during patrols to help identify these individuals.



Figure 1-2: Ammo dump

The enemy uses primarily military ordnance to prepare IEDs. Much of the ammunition (ammo) comes from pre-war stocks of Iraqi munitions. Engineer units and other organizations continue to destroy these stockpiles. Insurgents now rely on caches they established earlier.

In the early days of the war, military ammo dumps were the primary source for IED materials.

**Cache**

Insurgents have cached quantities of IED materials throughout the countryside. Caches may be located near concentrations of IED attacks.



**Figure 1-3: Cache**



## Chapter 2

### Types of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Threats

The enemy uses military ordnance to make most IEDs. Any enemy cell with access to artillery or mortar rounds can put together an IED. IEDs may be mobile, such as a car bomb or stationary, such as an artillery shell buried along a roadside. The enemy uses a variety of methods to initiate IEDs. Insurgent forces may use radios or command wire to initiate the attack, or they may place a device with an anti-handling initiation system in a location so an unsuspecting patrol member finds it and activates the device by triggering it. The bomb maker will use any available components, but he will usually have a preferred technique. IEDs are usually concealed.

#### IED Acronyms

You should understand a few key abbreviations used to describe IEDs. Briefs and reports filled with undefined acronyms can confuse readers. Coalition forces use the following four acronyms to categorize IEDs. Any additional characteristics describing the device should be spelled out.

**RCIED (radio controlled IED):** Initiated electronically with a wireless method consisting of a transmitter and a receiver (e.g., radio, key fob, cordless telephone).

**CWIED (command wire IED):** Initiated with a wire and power source.

**VOIED (victim operated IED):** A booby-trap initiated by actions of an unsuspecting person.

**VBIED (vehicle borne IED):** A vehicle filled with explosives, then driven to a target and detonated while either moving or static. The initiation method of a VBIED should be spelled out in reports (e.g. remote controlled VBIED, command wired VBIED, timed VBIED, and suicide VBIED).

**Note that the first three refer to a means of initiation, while the last one is a type of IED. All four abbreviations are commonly used in theater to describe IEDs.**


#### RCIEDs

Radio controlled is the most common method of IED initiation in Iraq. The enemy uses a variety of remote controlled devices to activate IEDs. They have modified car alarms, garage door openers, car door openers, toy car or airplane controllers, wireless door bells, long-range cordless phones, and Family Radio System (FRS) radios. Anything that transmits a radio signal can be adapted to function as a triggering device. With time, the enemy has continued to improve device design and construction techniques. RCIEDs also have a reduced signature and can be emplaced quicker than command-wire IEDs.

The enemy uses remote control to give himself a standoff capability. He can watch coalition forces and activate the device from a distance, while preventing compromise.



**Figure 2-1: Variety of RCIED components captured in a raid.**



**Figure 2-2: Examples of frequency operated initiators (key fobs)**




Figure 2-3: Wireless doorbell initiator



Figure 2-4: Radio controlled toy controllers used as initiators



**Figure 2-5: Family Radio System (FRS) radio**



**Figure 2-6: LRCT (long-range cordless telephone) with safe-to-arm timer**

### Command Wire IEDs

Command wire IEDs take time for the insurgent to emplace. The wire leading from the device to the firing point may be concealed. The firing point is fixed. Recent improvements in this capability include micro-thin wires that make it more difficult to visually detect the wire leading to the device.



**Figure 2-6: Command wire IED buried in the road. Wires leading off to the right go to the insurgent's firing point.**

## Victim Operated IEDs

IEDs are problem enough, and now the enemy has added booby traps to some IEDs making the device a victim operated IED (VOIED). The devices have been created as a response to coalition forces' (CF) actions with IEDs. Bombers have used VOIEDs in locations where Soldiers might easily find them or have been observed handling found IEDs. The initiation systems range from the simple pull pin pictured below, to much more complicated devices.

***Lesson learned: DO NOT PULL WIRES OR DISTURB SUSPICIOUS ITEMS.***

Another system that could be used by bombers is the collapsing circuit IED. This device is designed to go off when the loop (bait) wire is cut.

***Lesson learned: DO NOT CUT WIRES.***

Bombers have numerous variations on anti handling devices. There is only one way to be certain when dealing with a suspicious object.

***Lesson learned: DO NOT HANDLE.***



**Figure 2-7: Trip wire/Command pull**



**Figure 2-8: Anti-handling device**

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel are highly trained for dealing with IEDs and unexploded ordnance. If you need them or are in doubt, call EOD.

## Pressure Switch VOIED



**Figure 2-9: Site of a victim operated IED attack. Fortunately for CF, the two cows arrived first and triggered the device.**


A patrol encountered two mutilated cows with possible wires leading from the carcasses. One of the cows stepped on the pressure plate of an improvised pressure switch.

The incident is believed to be linked to a rocket attack. The point of origin (POO) was located approximately 300 meters away from the device. The road where the VOIED was emplaced is the only route leading to the POO, which makes it highly probable that the device was emplaced to ambush CF during their immediate response to the rocket attack.

CF must use extreme caution when investigating the POO of a rocket or mortar attack. To prevent becoming predictable, avoid the obvious routes and vary the routes if the enemy continues to conduct attacks from the same location.

### Timed IEDs

Timers are normally used to act as a safe separation timer. On few occasions will they be used to initiate the device. When used as the former, it separates the power source from the electric blasting caps to provide the enemy with a safer system to employ. This technique allows unskilled emplacers to arm a device with less likelihood of error.



**Figure 2-10: Washing machine timer**

### **Vehicle Borne IEDs**

VBIEDs are a major threat in theater, and there has been a rising trend of attacks on patrols and convoys. Suicide VBIED attacks are on the rise throughout the Iraqi theater of operations and currently represent one of the most deadly forms of enemy attack against both CF and the Iraqi people. As the threat continues to migrate around the country, all units need to be vigilant in protecting themselves against this growing enemy TTP.

The potential for a VBIED to employ huge amounts of explosives against a fixed or moving target with catastrophic results makes them one of the most deadly forms of attack. Defense against VBIEDs requires alert Soldiers, good tactics, and constant evaluation of the local situation. Soldiers manning traffic control points (TCPs) and entry control points (ECPs) must remain vigilant and need to be trained for VBIED detection. TCPs and ECPs must be set up to minimize the effects of a large explosion. The defense of patrols and convoys against VBIEDs requires the constant and aggressive employment of 360 degree security.

One of the most important things that you can do to protect you and your unit against the threat of VBIEDs is to create standoff between yourselves and civilian traffic. Remember, while most vehicles out there are harmless, any vehicle has the potential to be VBIED. When halted, do not simply pull over to the side of the road (see Figure 2-11).



**Figure 2-11: Civilian traffic makes identifying VBIEDs difficult. These civilian vehicles are too close to the patrol.**

When possible, get off the road and away from the flow of traffic. If that is not possible, create stand off by redirecting traffic with wire, cones, obstacles, and signs. Do not give a VBIED the opportunity to get within close proximity to coalition troops.



**Figure 2-12: Do not pull off the road and bunch up. Maintain tactical intervals at halts.**

## **Suicide Bombers**

Suicide bombers have attacked CF in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Most of the suicide attacks we see on the news involve suicide VBIEDs (SVBIED) and have included casualties in the tens to hundreds. However, there is an increasing trend for suicide bombers to attack with an explosive vest, belt, or baggage. CF in Iraq have been attacked within the perimeter of an forward operating base (FOB); Iraqis have been attacked at polling stations and at police recruitment drives; and a civilian contractor was killed when a bomber exited a vehicle in traffic, approached the contractor's vehicle, and detonated his vest/belt. With effective techniques being used to reduce the effectiveness of VBIEDs, the potential for the enemy to adapt to suicide bombers increases.

**Explosive charges.** If the charges used by bombers are effectively packaged and concealed, a suicide bomber could carry up to 45 pounds of explosives. However, most suicide belts are designed to hold smaller amounts, usually several charges that together have a total weight of up to about 12 pounds. The mass of this weight of explosive promotes conformity of the belt to the individual, improving concealment. Note that fragment producing materials are often incorporated into the charges and are, therefore, included in the total weight. Finally, the use of suicide vests cannot be ruled out. These would allow for larger charges.

**Indicators a potential suicide attack.** Possible indicators are as follows:

- An individual who deliberately ignores orders to stop or attempts to circumvent a security checkpoint
- An individual wearing too much clothing for the prevailing weather conditions
- A person with suspicious bulges in his/her clothing, carrying packages/bags or wearing satchels/backpacks
- An individual handling wires, switches, an actuator, or a "dead man's" switch

**Defensive actions.** Based on observed suicide bomber TTP, the following actions may prove effective:

- Evacuation orders should be issued immediately. Safe distances depend upon the mass of explosive carried by the bomber and the amount and type of fragmentation used.
- "Close and negotiate" tactics **should not be attempted**, as suicide bombers are usually trained to avoid surrender at all costs.
- A "fail safe" cell phone or radio-controlled initiator could be used in the event that the bomber is incapacitated or hesitates. This tactic would normally involve a second suspect with a line-of-sight view of the bomber and should always be considered.
- If a "deadly force" response is taken, bullet impact may initiate/detonate the explosive charge(s). Firing on the suspect should be undertaken from protective cover.
- If the suspect is neutralized and there is no explosion, **do not administer first aid**. Wait for EOD to render safe the explosive charge.



## Chapter 3

### Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Recognition

#### IED Components



Figure 3-1

Recognizing the various components of an IED is important for patrol and convoy members, Soldiers manning traffic and entry control points, and Soldiers conducting searches. The identification of component parts may be the only indicator that a Soldier is near an IED or has found a bomb maker when conducting searches.

An IED consists of three primary parts:

- An initiation system
- A casing
- The main charge

#### IED Emplacement

Insurgents emplace stationary IEDs either deliberately or hastily. Insurgents may take days to emplace an IED, or they can complete the task in minutes. Deliberate emplacement may take place in stages, or it can be completed in one effort. When done in stages, the enemy prepares the site. A hole is dug at a pre-determined location. There is no conspicuous material other than a shovel required for this stage. Next the IED is emplaced and the hole is camouflaged. When the attacker is ready, the device is primed and initiated when coalition forces (CF) patrols/convoys are in the kill zone.

The enemy uses this technique to accustom patrols to seeing disturbances on the ground. After one or two investigations, the patrol bypasses the site because it is “just like yesterday.”

As pressure increases on the enemy, they may resort to hasty emplacement. This may involve dropping a device in front of a moving patrol, or the enemy may quickly dig in a device. Either way, the devices usually are not as well concealed as a deliberately emplaced IED. Do not focus solely on the tell-tale signs; look for the obvious, too.

**Note:** A poorly concealed IED may be a hoax, designed to set you up for a well concealed secondary.



**Figure 3-2: A hasty or interrupted emplacement**

One technique used by anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) is to use the same IED location several times or to use locations in close proximity to each other. The enemy favors this technique because of his past success, familiarity with the terrain, perceived safe initiation point, and its potential proximity to a cache.



**Figure 3-3: Stretch of road that was the site of multiple IEDs. Coalition forces (CF) should pay particular attention to this area and consider placing snipers or an ambush to observe and kill the emplacers.**

### **Telltale Signs of Roadside IEDs**

During a patrol or IED hunting mission, some specific indicators may give the first clue that the enemy has placed an IED near your route. Look for vehicles that follow you for a long distance and then pull off the road. Freshly-dug holes, new asphalt patches, filled-in potholes, and new dirt or gravel piles alongside a road may conceal an IED. Obstacles placed in the roadway, like abandoned or disabled cars, might be put there to make a patrol pass closer to an IED. Recently cleared brush next to a road may have been cut to allow an enemy observer to see the IED. Occasionally, insurgents will signal the approach of a coalition convoy using flares, city lights, or other signaling techniques.

**Technique:** When patrols observe possible IED emplacement signs, they should report them to their S2 and S3, disseminate the location to other units for future reference, and attempt to mark the site. Some units spray paint potential IED holes in order to make it more difficult to conceal future work. If on a patrol, a unit notices that the observed hole has been patched up, they should treat the site as a possible IED location as road repair crews are almost non-existent in Iraq.



**Figure 3-4: Is this an IED? Look for the five IED indicators to determine if it is a threat.**

If you are familiar with an area from past patrols or IED hunting missions, something out of the ordinary may also indicate an IED. Fewer people than normal might be an indicator that you are in the vicinity of an IED; take appropriate action and be aware of the potential IED.

Examining a suspected IED from a safe distance may reveal one of the five IED indicators: wires, both exposed and concealed; antennas; detonation cord; or exposed ordnance.

Some example indicators that may allow you to separate IEDs from everyday trash include:



**Exposed Wires**



**Concealed Wires**



**Antennas**

**Figure 3-5: IED Indicators**



**Figure 3-6: Det cord (especially red or white)**



**Figure 3-7: Exposed ordnance**

### Where Does the Enemy Place IEDs?

Insurgents put IEDs where coalition forces go. You must go near a stationary IED before it can be used in an attack. IEDs will be found on, under, or beside roads, tracks, and paths used by patrols and convoys. The enemy likes roads that have a high volume of coalition traffic. IEDs appear along the shoulder of the road or in the medians of divided highways and streets. They may be in culverts, hanging from guardrails, or placed on the inside of turns in an attempt to catch you cutting corners. IEDs placed along main supply routes and alternate supply routes target all CF movement/personnel. IEDs can be found on rural paths, too. IEDs placed near unimproved roads usually target patrols. Trails that get little coalition traffic are suitable for larger bombs, because they take longer to emplace and the reduced coalition traffic means less chance of discovery. Particular attention should be paid to choke points, such as traffic circles or bridges, turn around points at boundaries, and intersections.

All repetitive action must be closely scrutinized. Constantly ask, “Are we setting a pattern and being predictable?” If so, “How can we vary our actions?” Setting patterns gives the insurgents a place to attack.

### General Characteristics

Four elements comprise the “typical” IED site:

- **Prior successful attack:** If it worked in the past, it will work again, especially if the site has several good tactical features.
- **Good over watch position:** Since most command-detonated devices require direct observation, the enemy needs a good overwatch position.
- **Concealed escape route:** Most insurgents will quickly retreat after the attack.
- **Observation point with obstacles:** To prevent capture, the enemy will select an observation point with obstacles between the IED site and the

firing point. Natural or manmade obstacles work. Canals, berms, and fences all hinder friendly pursuit.




Figure 3-8: IED attack site: Note the three obstacles and escape route.

### Hiding IEDs

The enemy uses many forms of concealment for IEDs. Anything that can conceal an artillery round might be used to hide an IED. Roadside debris in Iraq makes IED recognition difficult. The following illustrations are just a few of the more common concealment methods found in Iraq.



**Dirt piles**



**Gravel**



**Garbage piles**



**Culverts**



**Trash bags**




**Curb materials**



**Burlap bags**



**Brush**



**Signs**



**Light poles**



**Tires**



**Tree trunks**



**Cars**



**Dead dogs or sheep**



**Trucks**



**Old IED holes**



**Roadside carts**



**Abandoned coalition vehicles**



**Boxes**



**Pothole or washed-out road**

**Figure 3-9: IED concealment**



**Figure 3-10**

IED attacks can use pre-positioned cover. In one case, the IED is believed to have been placed in piles of dirt that were dumped on the edge of the road prior to the attack.

***Lesson: The enemy is predictable, too. CF must be aware of what the enemy is doing to effectively counter the enemy efforts.***

Attacks using pre-positioned cover may be emplaced in stages. After dumping the dirt, the enemy probably watched patrols drive by the piles for about a week. They then emplaced the IEDs as they continued to observe the patterns of the patrols and decided on a time to complete the attack.

**Technique:** Patrols need to report everything that changes along their routes and coordinate to either have it removed or modified so that it is no longer a threat. The enemy is constantly studying our reaction to different situations. Often, it is the lack of action that provides the enemy an opportunity to complete an attack.

### Pre-deployment Preparation

Follow up on classroom briefings by letting Soldiers experience IED component identification in the field. Soldiers should practice the detection and identification the tell-tale signs of IEDs both mounted and dismounted, day and night.

### Identifying vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDS)

The enemy uses VBIEDs either as a mobile or static bomb. Mobile VBIEDs move to the intended target. Targets can be pre-selected, like a fixed site or an event, or the target can be chosen at random. Insurgents have waited alongside a coalition route waiting for a convoy to pass. The bomber then drives the VBIED into the convoy and detonates. A variation of this technique is a “straggler” vehicle that will drop behind moving Iraqi traffic and as the patrol passes the straggler, the vehicle swerves into the patrol and detonates.

Stationary VBIEDs are placed near coalition routes; the bomber initiates the attack when a patrol passes the VBIED.

### Detecting mobile VBIEDs

VBIEDs may be detected based on vehicle and driver characteristics, driver’s actions, as well as signs from the immediate area.

Potential indicators of moving VBIEDs:

- Vehicle characteristics:
  - Noticeable sagging of the vehicle
  - An additional antenna for radio-controlled devices
  - Darkened or covered windows to conceal either vehicle’s contents or actions of the driver
  - Recent painting of vehicle to cover body alterations
  - Crudely covered holes made in the vehicle body to hide explosives.
  - New welding marks
  - No license plates
  - Escorted by unusual security detail for type vehicle
  - New tires on an old vehicle
- Driver characteristics/actions:
  - The presence of a lone male driver in the vehicle. This is the historical standard for VBIED operations; however, there could be any number of people in the vehicle if an unsuspecting person is driving the VBIED. Some VBIEDs have two to three people and females are sometimes used as a distraction.

- Ignoring orders to stop, attempting to circumvent a security checkpoint, or attempting to maneuver too close to coalition assets.
- Unusual appearance. Insurgents may be uncharacteristically clean-shaven and have very short haircuts. Cutting the hair is a part of the purifying ritual that many follow prior to an attack.
- Age in the mid-twenties. The average Middle Eastern suicide terrorist is about 24 or 25, but in the current Iraqi situation, age is less of a discriminator.
- Driving erratically; driving too slow or too fast.
- Wearing inappropriate dress for the environment.
- Local signs:
  - Camera crew “hanging out” near your area
  - Vehicle observed more than once
  - Absence of normal for that area of operations (AO).
  - Odd traffic patterns.
  - Person or persons observed conducting reconnaissance.
  - Vehicle testing local defenses, i.e., drives at a high speed towards traffic control point (TCP) and then breaks off.

### **Pre-deployment Preparation**

Soldiers should practice identifying VBIED threats and using escalation of force techniques. Soldiers need to see how quickly an approaching vehicle can close on a TCP or patrol and determine where they need to establish their stop line, engagement line, etc.

### **Detecting Stationary VBIEDs**

- Vehicle characteristics:
  - Blocked view into vehicle; windows are darkened or obstructed with curtains or cardboard
  - Vehicle does not fit the AO
  - Illegally parked or “broken down” at a choke point
  - Multiple antennas visible
  - Parked near a high profile target
  - Vehicle parked unusually close to moving traffic
  - Missing license plate
- Local signs:
  - Camera crew “hanging out” for no apparent reason
  - Difference in behavior of local population

- Significant event or gathering of Iraqis scheduled to take place nearby

Items worth a second look from TCPs, patrols, and convoys that can provide additional clues about VBIEDs:

- Signs of tampering or modification (e.g., bent sheet metal or broken parts)
- Unusual items inside the vehicle: gas cylinders, wires, leaflets, large bags or boxes, and batteries besides the normal car battery
- Newly added lamps, switches, button, or LED indicators on the dashboard
- Indications of a triggering device (i.e., a switch, radio transmitter, timer, wires, or ropes passing from the front seat to the rear of the vehicle) visible near the driver, under the seat, or within arms reach. Exposed wire or cable running from front seat to rear area
- Evidence that an interior door panel has been removed to hide explosives or poorly fitted door trim
- The presence of powder or prills (small rounded granular material) left when explosive material was loaded into the vehicle
- Additional fuel tanks
- Unusual smells (e.g., smoke, gasoline, fertilizer, sulfur, diesel fuel)
- Any disturbance to the undercoating or dirt on the bottom of a vehicle, fresh undercoating on an older vehicle
- Recently painted vehicles
- New parts not consistent with overall condition
- Stress cracks in the windshield due to excessive weight (no stone or chip marks)
- Small pieces of string, wire, or tape in or around the vehicle
- No spare tire or tire sounds solid when thumped
- Missing vehicle identification number (VIN). No or new license plates
- Unusually large packages in passenger compartments



## Chapter 4

### Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Attacks

#### How the Enemy Attacks with IEDs

The enemy most often uses command-initiated IEDs, either radio controlled improvised explosive device (RCIED) or command wire improvised explosive devices (CWIEDs). Either type of initiator requires the device to be within sight of the enemy.

#### Hoax IEDs

The enemy uses fake IEDs to accomplish two things: observe our reaction so they can prepare a later attack or set up a patrol for an attack in another kill zone.

Hoax IEDs cause units to react. Insurgents first place the fake device in an easy-to-spot location. Enemy forces watch or videotape coalition actions, such as security, command post (CP) locations, distances, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) actions. They review this information to find friendly patterns. When they think they know our actions, they can plant a real IED.

Insurgents use hoax IEDs to cause us to react to a sighting. The enemy has placed fake IEDs in a readily-observed location to cause patrols to stop and deploy. Because the enemy has watched previous patrols, they put real IEDs at likely CP or security locations. After they set off the real IED, the enemy might attack with rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) or small arms fire.



**Figure 4-1: Hoax IED made with box and black electrical tape. The box had rocks inside. Insurgents use hoax IEDs to observe friendly force reactions or to tie up EOD and IED hunting patrols for extended periods.**

### **Ambushes at Previous Successful Attack Sites**

One enemy technique is to emplace IEDs in the same location repetitively. If it worked yesterday, it will work today. On one occasion, the enemy emplaced four IEDs in the exact same spot in one day. Knowing where the enemy has struck before allows you to predict where he may strike in the future. This knowledge is useful both for defensive and offensive operations.

In the defense, a unit can increase their awareness and check the area before driving through, or the leader can choose an alternate route. In the offense, units can emplace observation posts (OPs) or sniper teams in order to have the best chance of engaging a bomber in the act of placing an IED (rules of engagement [ROE]). Additionally, IED sites that have been used more than once have a much higher probability of having caches (normally found within 500 meters) that can be located with dismounted patrols using mine detectors.

### **IED Attacks on Patrol Routes**

IEDs placed along rural routes tend to be larger and more destructive than roadside IEDs along main supply routes (MSRs). This is because the enemy has more time to dig in the device, and he takes advantage of the available time by packing more net explosive weight into the IED. Routes along canal roads, rural paths, and restricted roads may be potential sites.

**Observation:** Use caution when patrolling a route that has not seen much coalition activity or one that has not had much observation lately. The lack of coalition eyes-on gives the insurgents an opportunity to dig in a large IED.

**Technique:** Thoroughly clear potential ambush sites along your patrol route, especially culverts and constricted terrain. If it was a danger area at the beginning of your tour, it is a danger area today. Do not become complacent. The use of specialized equipment such as the Meerkat or Husky improve a patrol's chance of finding buried IEDs in this situation, as does dismounted searches using mine detectors.



**Figure 4-2: Turnaround point on patrol route.  
Do not use the same spot consistently!**

**Observation:** Do not use the same turnaround point continuously. This often occurs at boundaries. Some patrols have been observed using the same crossover point nine times in the same patrol. This is a pattern! Coordinate with adjacent units to use crossover points further down the route.



**Figure 4-3: IED located at a turnaround point. Vary your crossover spot on routes. The enemy will notice if you use the same spot.**

### **IED Ambushes on Convoy Routes**

Attacks on convoys tend to be more opportunistic. The sheer number of coalition convoys gives the enemy a choice of targets. Because the routes are usually cleared by IED hunting teams, the enemy cannot often site large IEDs on these routes. However, a successful IED attack does not need a large device.

#### **Ambushes at indirect fire points of origin**

One recurring enemy technique is the placement of an IED at the point of origin (POO) or the route leading to the POO, for indirect fires. The enemy knows, based on friendly patterns, that a patrol will be sent to investigate the firing point after a mortar attack on a forward operating base (FOB). Devices have been found along routes leading to the POO, and they have been found at the firing point itself. Quick reaction forces (QRFs) should exercise extreme caution when moving to investigate. The enemy has likely left the area long before the patrol arrives anyway.

**Technique:** The first question the patrol should ask is: Can I see the POO? Do I have to approach the exact spot? If you must go to the firing point, clear towards the POO from several hundred meters out. Make every effort to locate potential trigger men. The enemy knows you are coming to the POO and approximately when you will arrive. Be prepared. Do not rush to the firing point and then look for the triggerman. It will be too late!

**Technique:** Instead of rushing to the firing point, immediately establish traffic control points (TCPs) around routes leading to the POO location. Search departing vehicles to find the mortar tube and enemy.



**Figure 4-4: If it looks suspicious, it is!**

**What:** Patrol was dispatched to investigate the point of origin (POO) of a rocket attack. When they arrived, they found that the rocket launchers were mounted to the top of a car. While investigating the vehicle and rocket launchers, an IED inside the vehicle detonated.

**Likely Intent:** A ruse to draw ground troops and/or EOD into an IED ambush at the POO.

**Recommendation:** Assume all points of origin have booby-traps and/or observed ambush sites. Enemy TTP at the POO may include buried IEDs in the general vicinity, IEDs on the road approaching the POO, or booby-trapped launch systems using a timed initiating device. As with IEDs, expose the minimum number of Soldiers to investigate potential hazards at a POO. Make maximum use of optics to include binoculars, night vision devices (NVDs), and thermals to investigate the POO from a safe distance. Use aviation assets when available to minimize ground troop exposure.

### Hoax “Come On” Attacks

The “come on” tactic has been used by anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) for quite some time, but there has been a noticeable increase when new units take over an area of operations (AO). The use of this TTP is a clear indicator that AIF are observing and studying the TTP being used by our patrols, QRF, and EOD, to include routes used by responding forces, security and cordon procedures, and IED disarming techniques.

The “come on” technique is an attempt by AIF to inflict casualties by drawing coalition forces into a desired kill zone, while maintaining maximum survivability with planned escape routes.

### Stand-off IEDs

The enemy places most IEDs made from military ordnance on or near the coalition route. In an attempt to avoid detection by IED hunting teams, the enemy began using stand-off IEDs in mid-2004. This type of IED is hidden along the route, but they are placed outside the customary search limits used to detect artillery-based IEDs. In the past, most roadside IEDs were found within 10 feet of the edge of the road. With the increased use of stand-off IEDs, which are generally found farther from the edge of the road, patrols may need to modify their search techniques.

These devices are most effectively used at choke points or turnaround points, where CF vehicles must stop or slow to maneuver. Three primary devices have been seen in Iraq: explosively formed penetrators (EFP), improvised rocket launchers (IRL), and homemade Claymore-type mines. The first two stand-off devices provide AIF a direct fire, anti-armor weapon system while maintaining maximum survivability. EFPs, sometimes referred to as platter charges, work like high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds. As the device detonates, the metal facing forms a high-speed slug, which can penetrate armored vehicles. A platter charge, with an improvised directional antipersonnel device in close proximity, was found near one IED attack site.



Figure 4-5: Combination of a standoff device and secondary IED



Figure 4-6: Improvised launchers used to fire high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds or rounds containing flechette.



Figure 4-7: Explosively formed penetrator(EFP)



**Figure 4-8: Homemade Claymore-type device**

#### **TRAFFIC DETOUR OR IED?**

We are all familiar with traffic cones and what they are used for. In Iraq, traffic cones can serve as concealment for an IED. Enemy forces placed an artillery round and what was believed to be an radio controlled receiver inside a traffic cone. The traffic cone was placed next to a Jersey barrier where it would blend in and not be considered out of place. The phrase “anything can be an IED” is becoming an overused cliché for many Soldiers in Iraq. But using a traffic cones to conceal IEDs is a reminder to all of us just how true this cliché is.

#### **Danger Recovering Abandoned Vehicles**

Sometimes the tactical situation after an ambush does not permit the immediate recovery of damaged vehicles. So what should units do when given the mission of recovering a vehicle that has been abandoned? The first thing is to remember that you may be traveling into another ambush. Study the area around the vehicle and look for possible firing points for an IED. Have patrols check out those areas before moving in close to the abandoned vehicle.



**Figure 4-9: Use caution when approaching an abandoned coalition vehicle; insurgents may have planted an IED inside.**

Use binoculars or other optics to study the ground around the vehicle and also study the vehicle. An IED may be emplaced inside or on the vehicle itself. Only after security is in place and the area has been checked should Soldiers begin the recovery process. EOD may be effectively used to sweep the area with robots prior to making a manual approach. When the decision to approach is made, minimize your exposure and use the minimum number of Soldiers to “clear” the vehicle and conduct a 5 and 25 meter search (see discussion in Chapter 5) of the area surrounding the disabled vehicle.

#### **Abandoned Vehicle Recovery**

A contractor’s fuel truck was hit by an IED. The fuel truck began burning and was abandoned. Two days later when recovery assets returned to recover the truck, an IED was found on the vehicle. The enemy emplaced the IED to target the Soldiers tasked with recovering the vehicle. Knowing that coalition forces will return to recover a damaged vehicle makes the vehicle a lucrative location for an IED.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Moving in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Environment**

Moving in an IED environment demands patience and common sense. Mounted movement requires thorough preparation and rehearsals, regardless of the type of unit or vehicles used. All movements in theater are combat operations. Units do not run supply convoys; they conduct combat logistics patrols (CLP). Patrolling and combat logistics patrols have some common considerations, but they also have quite different objectives.

Frankly, for patrols and convoys, it is impractical to stop at everything that might be an IED. There is too much debris on the sides of the roads.

Some general recommendations for movement include the following:

- Always conduct pre-combat inspections (PCI) and pre-combat checks (PCC) before the mission.
- Employ IED-hunting teams prior to departure
- Deploy overwatch positions at high threat areas (do not set a pattern)
- Drive at a safe/fast speed in the center of the road
- Maintain tactical interval
- Maintain aggressive posture/360° security
- Know and understand the rules of engagement (ROE) and chain of command guidance
- Conduct a thorough operations order (OPORD) and rehearsal of immediate action drills
- Maintain stand-off from potential vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) by the use of signs, aggressive posture, defensive/offensive driving techniques, air horns, and high-intensity white lights (night)

Remember, every movement made in theater is a combat operation and the enemy is watching for a soft target of opportunity.



**Figure 5-1: Are your external fuel cans necessary? Ensure you do a proper mission analysis, and do not risk secondary fires or injury for no reason!**

### **Patrolling**

One of the most important things you can do to protect yourself and your unit against the possibility of an IED attack is to limit your predictability. This is much more than varying the times of movement. You also need to consider varying routes, movement techniques, and your TTP for dealing with different situations. Remember, the enemy is always watching. For example, if you react to a specific situation such as a disabled vehicle or suspected IED the same way every time the enemy will quickly catch on and will use this knowledge to his advantage.

In an effort to counter route predictability, patrols should change direction at seemingly random intervals, especially in areas of previous IED attacks.

Where practical and safe, move against the normal flow of traffic, turn around at points not normally used, and move overland parallel to an established route in order to vary your observable movement tactics. Additionally, these techniques will present the patrol with a different and often more advantageous observation angle that may reveal the “backside” of an IED that was poorly camouflaged.

### **Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device (RCIED) Electronic Warfare (CREW)**

CREW is in theater to provide protection for patrols. It is beyond the scope of this document to cover the TTP and capabilities of the systems you will have available in theater. You should incorporate CREW TTP in pre-deployment training to identify how you will use the equipment and adjust your staff to best use this system.

Further information can be found via Secure Internet Protocol Network Radio (SIPRNET) at two Web sites:

<http://www.portal.inscom.army.smil.mil/jieddtf/default.aspx>

<http://ecm-emi.jioc.smil.mil/>

You can contact the Joint IED Defeat Task Force for CREW training and information.

### **Actions at Halts**

No one single set of procedures will work for all situations.

If a patrol or convoy must stop during movement, employ techniques to create standoff. Remember to conduct 5 and 25 meter searches as described in the following section. In addition, establish your own local security every time the convoy or patrol halts. Avoid clustering vehicles and vary the vehicle interval between elements. If you will be stopped for any length of time, improve your position constantly and consider contingencies (hasty and deliberate defense) for the site you are occupying. Most importantly, do not remain at one site too long. The enemy has planned and executed attacks against units that remain in place too long.

### **5 and 25 Meter Searches at Halts**


Any patrol or convoy halting for any length of time must consider itself vulnerable to attack.

At all halts, Soldiers must clear the area around their vehicles. Depending on the length of time at the halt, the area to clear varies from 5 to 25 meters. At every halt, no matter how short, the crew must clear 5 meters around the vehicle while inside. For extended halts, teams must clear 25 meters around the patrol or convoy. Begin 5 to 25 before stopping to avoid stopping on top of an IED.

**Observation:** One OIF leader observed: “If Soldiers would conduct a 5 and 25 with the same vigilance as their actions at a clearing barrel, there would be no issues with 5 and 25.”

### **5 meter checks:**

- Identify a position to halt.
- Visually check the area 5 meters around your vehicles .
- Look for disturbed earth and suspicious objects, loose bricks in walls, and security ties on streetlights or anything out of the ordinary.
- Start your search at ground level and continue up above head height. Then conduct a physical check for a radius of 5 meters around your position. Be systematic, take your time, and show curiosity. If the tactical situation permits, use a white light or infrared (IR) light at night.
- If in an armored vehicle, remain mounted during your 5 meter check to take advantage of the vehicle’s protection.



**Figure 5-2**

**25 meter checks:**

- Add to the 5 meter check when the patrol or convoy leader decides to occupy an area for any length of time.
- Once 5 meter checks are conducted, continue visually scanning out to 25 meters.
- Conduct a physical search for a radius of 25 meters around your position.
- Look for IED indicators and anything out of the ordinary.





Figure 5-3



A unit set up a static observation post (OP) to monitor traffic along a 200-meter stretch of one of the main supply routes (MSRs). The unit had been in the position for about 30-45 minutes when an IED detonated in close proximity to their position, resulting in both casualties and damage to equipment. The EOD team assessed that the IED had been placed at ground level about 10-15 feet away from the OP.

All patrols must remember that it is critical to conduct thorough searches immediately upon halting, in order to discover any potential hazards. The 5/25 meter check is a life-saving drill and should be conducted thoroughly.

### **Counter VBIED Techniques**

The key to surviving a VBIED attack is standoff and cover. Top gunners and security personnel should be alert and constantly aware of any vehicle approaching their patrol or parked along the route. Within the ROE, any suspicious vehicle should not be allowed to approach coalition forces. Employ warning signs to tell civilian drivers to remain clear of a moving convoy. Convoy and patrol members should know the authorized escalation of force procedures. Be aware of danger areas/choke points such as turnoffs that force the patrol to slow down. Watch merging traffic as VBIEDs have used on or off ramps to get near coalition vehicles. Also, stress to security personnel that a VBIED can come from any direction. Units have been attacked by vehicles turning into a patrol from oncoming traffic.

When moving in a convoy, make sure you do not present a lucrative target for a VBIED. Maintain an aggressive security posture and have a plan for dealing with civilian traffic. Conduct a proper mission analysis to determine how and if you are going to allow civilian traffic to pass or come within close proximity to your convoy. If you are going to allow civilian traffic to pass your convoy, make sure you have developed a technique to visually check cars and drivers as they approach. If you are not going to allow civilian traffic to pass your convoy, make sure that you have a plan to let Iraqis know to stay back, and have a plan for the escalation of force. This can include, but is not limited to, the use of signs in Arabic, formations that take up all lanes in the road, visual signals, use of an air horn, and the use of flares to warn cars to stay back before firing disabling shots. Remember, by creating standoff to control the battlespace, you can prevent the enemy from successfully employing his VBIED. Do not make yourself a potential target.

### **Maintaining standoff: mobile**

Escalation of force techniques/ROE: The techniques used should be simple, clean, and definite:

- Aggressive/defensive vehicle maneuvers
- Signs in Arabic on the rear of vehicle (“Stay Back, Do Not Pass”)
- Hand and arm signals
- Air horn/siren/bull horn/whistle
- Spotlight (nighttime)
- Green lasers

- Non-lethal warnings
- Chem-lites, water bottles
- Use of pen flares
- Flashbangs
- 40-mm TP round
- Warning shots.
- Engage vehicle with weapon, if necessary (ROE).
- Engage the driver/occupants, if necessary (ROE).

The Soldier in the gunner position must be capable of making the decision of when to skip these steps and shoot immediately ( i.e., when detecting an oncoming vehicle that swerves towards the patrol to detonate a VBIED).



**Figure 5-5: Use signs to caution local drivers to remain clear of patrols.**

#### **Maintaining standoff: stationary**

- Recon site prior to occupation.
- Perform 5 and 25 search upon halt.
- Maximize distance from roadway (mine and buried IEDs may present a threat)
- Make use of natural barriers
- Maintain good dispersion

- Quickly establish overt perimeter:
  - Cones
  - Barbed wire
  - Signs
  - Road spikes
- Establish overwatch of primary position
- Defend in depth
- Position electronic countermeasure (ECM) devices for maximum coverage
- Keep roads clear of civilian vehicles

The following is an example of securing an MSR during a halt: Coalition forces (CF) have placed security forward and back to redirect traffic to minimize the VBIED threat. Traffic moving to the right (east) is forced across the median to the westbound lane. The lead security vehicle waves westbound traffic to the far lane, making room for the eastbound traffic. The lead vehicle can move back to the eastbound lane once the initial westbound traffic moves to minimize its exposure.




Figure 5-6: Maintaining standoff at halts

### Traffic control points

Traffic control points (TCPs) affect anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) travel and efforts, hindering AIF plans. While many TCPs do not turn up anything of consequence, there are numerous cases of TCPs resulting in significant finds. The increase of VBIEDs from AIF makes coalition static TCPs (those that remain in one location for an extended period of time) at an increased risk of being attacked.




Figure 5-7: Traffic control point setup

To counter the VBIED threat against static forces, limit the total time a TCP is emplaced and operational to 20-30 minutes (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations [METT-TC]). This technique ensures the TCP is quickly emplaced, executed, and recovered before insurgents are able to coordinate a dedicated response with a VBIED. Small arms and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) have also been used against TCPs that remain in place for extended periods. Additionally, a TCP that remains in place for an extended period loses its effectiveness. Word gets out, and insurgents can avoid the TCP.

**Technique:** Trap AIF who attempt to bypass TCPs by employing TCPs in series. Establish a TCP on a stretch of road. Shortly afterwards, establish secondary TCPs on potential escape routes. This bottles up AIF. If an insurgent sees the first TCP and attempts to turn around, he will run into the secondary location.



**Figure 5-8: What if the civilian car was a VBIED?**

Care needs to be taken to ensure TCP locations are random and time windows varied. In addition to limiting the time TCPs are emplaced, leaders should maximize the tactical spacing of coalition vehicles within the TCP and employ as many measures as practical to limit civilian traffic to close proximity of static troop concentrations. Some of these countermeasures include the following:

- Establish the search portion of the TCP off the main route.
- Use of signs in Arabic and English to give basic instructions.
- Position security vehicles (flanks) to maximize standoff distance.

- Take advantage of natural and manmade features to serve as obstacles to approaching threats e.g. guardrails, berms, etc.
- Search a position prior to occupying it; use optics prior to approach. (The enemy can predict the cover you will use.)



**Figure 5-9: Temporary traffic control point.**  
Limit the total time a TCP is emplaced to prevent VBIED attacks.

### **Combat Logistics Patrols (CLPs)**

One of the biggest mistakes that a Soldier can make is to start thinking he is a supporter and not a shooter.. Administrative peacetime procedures do not work, especially in Iraq. We are all taught never to leave the scene of an accident in peacetime. The police will give you a ticket! Yet stopping after a minor fender bender and awaiting the arrival of the police may be the wrong thing in Iraq. The enemy may see the stopped convoy and attack with a VBIED. Soldiers are also taught to drive with their lights on in the daytime. Not in Iraq! Lights on in daytime signals the approach of a military convoy, which gives the enemy additional time to prepare his ambush.

### **Convoys are combat operations**

If you want to get from point “A” to point “B” in training, you take a convoy. In Iraq and Afghanistan, convoys are combat operations known as CLPs. The enemy is trying his very best to kill coalition members riding in vehicles. It is never an “admin move” when traveling from one base camp to another. CLP commanders should use troop leading procedures and rehearsals for each and every convoy. Leaders must conduct PCI of vehicles. Make sure recovery equipment, ammunition,

first aid, and communications gear is present and operational. Inspect tow bars, tow straps, and chains for self-recovery. Check the location and fill of fire extinguishers. Discuss the route, vehicle separation, and frequencies with convoy members. For convoys that have larger vehicles, consider embedding a wrecker in every convoy for quick recovery.

Six months of “routine” milk runs can change in an instant. Leaders should prepare, brief, and rehearse contingency plans for wrecks, flat tires, stalled vehicles, direct or indirect fire contacts, and actions on contact with an IED, both pre- and post-blast. Keep in mind that the on-scene commander will have to make on-the-spot decisions. Not every circumstance can be covered by contingency planning. Be prepared to adjust to the specifics of your situation.

Review escalation of force rules for civilian vehicles that approach too closely. Rehearsals should lead to “pit crew proficiency” for all contingencies.

### **Immediate Action Drill Proficiency**

While traveling on a route near Baghdad, a supply convoy was attacked by enemy forces. Using their standing operating procedure (SOP), the convoy continued through the kill zone and stopped at what they felt was a safe distance away. As they surveyed the battle damage—one flat tire—enemy mortar rounds began impacting around them. Now, the convoy commander had to choose: abandon a vehicle or continue repairs under enemy contact. In the end, the convoy quickly replaced the tire and continued on their way.

Do not think for a moment this was an isolated incident. The enemy knows our general reaction patterns and applies this knowledge to launch follow-on attacks.

So, are you and your Soldiers prepared to execute vehicle recovery procedures, like towing or changing a tire? When was the last time you rehearsed them? You do rehearse them, right?

### **CLP considerations**

#### **Key points**

- Drivers concentrate on driving, not shooting
- Maintain “good tactical interval” based on METT-TC
- Maintain standoff from local traffic
- Stay on the hard-ball, do not cut corners and avoid pot holes
- Ballistic windows up; non ballistic windows down
- Drive in the center of the road when possible
- Top gunners cover overpasses with M4/M16
- Gunners remain at “eye ball” defilade in turrets as much as possible.

A CLP can increase its capability to secure itself:

- Normal peace-time convoy procedures do not work! For example, if you get a flat and you do not have a lot of security with you, you may have to drive on the rim to the next forward operating base (FOB). If you have a wreck, you might have to wait and report it to the proper authorities when you get to a safer area.
- Drive fast, but not so fast that your speed is more dangerous than the bomber; just do not go so slow that you make an easy target. Do not put your most inexperienced vehicle in the trail position and your most experienced driver in the lead, you are setting up the trail vehicle for an accident.
- Drive in the center of the road.
- If you get hit while you are in a convoy, focus out. Let the medics and combat lifesavers do their job. Your job is to follow the ROE and do everything in your power to neutralize the guy who just tried to kill you.
- If you have ballistic glass, keep it rolled up. Lots of lives have been saved because the ballistic glass was up. Many have been lost because the ballistic glass was down.
- Watch for man holes and potholes. Avoid them. Do not allow your vehicle to straddle them.
- Remember, bombers like to place their IEDs in the same hole over and over again.
- Beware of overhead passes. The enemy likes to use them for observation points. Watch them closely. Use M4s to allow top gunners to cover overpasses.
- Do not cut corners. Try to put your wheels where the guy ahead of you put his. It worked for him; maybe it will work for you.
- Keep your arms and legs inside the vehicle, even if it is not up-armored.
- Wear ballistic eye protection and some type of hearing protection.
- When your vehicle stops, scan your immediate area—every single time it stops (5-25).
- Due to secondary IEDs at attack sites, rehearse pushing a disabled vehicle out of the kill zone prior to recovery/repair efforts.

### **Pre-deployment Preparation**

Drivers need practice handling tactical vehicles at the higher speeds used in theater. Leaders should arrange for a safe training location, and drivers should learn how to operate their vehicles at high speed (greater than the 35 mph used in garrison operations) in urban, rural, day, and night scenarios.



## Chapter 6

### Actions on Contact

An improvised explosive device (IED) is a form of attack by the enemy. Any IED that detonates should be treated as an enemy contact. Contingency plans and rehearsals are key to concluding the contact, hopefully with the capture or death of the bomber. If you find an IED before it explodes, you must treat it like it will explode at any moment. The insurgent at the firing point may be waiting for more Soldiers to gather around the device before setting it off. He may be moving from an observation point (OP) to the firing point. Training on basic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) will enable you and your unit to win the engagement.

#### IED Found Before Detonation

##### The five "Cs"

The five "Cs" represent a simple set of guidelines that you should use when you encounter a suspected IED:

- Confirm
- Clear
- Call
- Cordon
- Control

**Confirm.** You should always assume the device will explode at any moment. From a safe distance and using a minimal number of personnel, look for IED indicators. Use any hard cover you have available while attempting to confirm the suspected IED, and never risk more personnel than the tactical situation requires. Use all tools at your disposal, to include moving to a better vantage point. Use optics to look for tell-tale signs of an IED: red detonating (det) cord, antennas, electrical wires, or exposed ordnance. Never ask civilians to remove an IED. You may solicit information regarding the suspected IED, but do not ask them to go up and “take a look.” Stay as far back as possible while looking for clues. When in doubt, back away. Do not ever touch.

**Note:** Do not attempt to do the job of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) or engineers.

**Clear.** Evacuate the area to a safe distance (around 300 meters) but do not set a pattern. If it is a VBIED, you will need more standoff. Get out of the IED’s line-of-sight. Assess whether your distance and cover is adequate. Direct people out of the danger area, and do not allow anyone to enter other than those responsible for rendering the IED safe, such as EOD. Question, search, and detain as needed. When you move to a new location, always check for secondary IEDs. Always assume that the found IED is a bait round and that the real IED is near your “secure” location. Team members should always scan their immediate surroundings for more IEDs. Report additional IEDs to the on-scene commander.

**Note:** You can protect EOD by preventing enemy observation of render safe procedures.

**Technique:** When responding to an IED site, possibly as part of a quick reaction or EOD security force, start clearing towards the suspected IED from 500 meters out as you approach. Remember; vary this distance to avoid setting a pattern!



**Figure 6-1**

**Clear the Area**

A patrol investigated a tire they spotted on their route that they considered to be suspicious and found two projectiles with a remote initiator. As they cordoned the area, they discovered an improvised rocket launcher (IRL) attached to a tree pointed towards the location of the primary device.

The launcher was 100 meters north of the IED in a palm grove. The device consisted of a high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) round in a steel pipe that was affixed approximately four feet high to a palm tree. It too had a remote control initiator.

This incident highlights the importance of sweeping 360 degrees around suspected IEDs when cordoning the area. If the security element had not searched the area to the north of the road, the IRL would not have been found and may have killed the EOD Soldiers responding to clear the primary IED.

**Call.** Let your higher headquarters know what you have found. Submit an IED/unexploded ordnance (UXO) report.

LINE 1. Date-time group (DTG): When the item was discovered?

LINE 2. Report activity and location: Unit and grid location of the IED/UXO.

LINE 3. Contact method: Radio frequency, call sign, point of contact (POC), and telephone number.

LINE 4. Type of ordinance: Dropped, projected, placed, or thrown; give the number of items if more than one.

LINE 5. Nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) contaminations: Be as specific as possible.

LINE 6. Resources threatened: Equipment, facilities, or other assets that are threatened.

LINE 7. Impact on mission: Short description of current tactical situation and how the device affects the status of the mission.

LINE 8. Protective measures: Any protective measures taken to protect personnel and equipment.

LINE 9. Recommended priority: Immediate, indirect, minor, no threat.

**Cordon.** Establish blocking positions to prevent vehicle and foot traffic from approaching the IED. Immediately search the safe area for secondary IEDs before occupying it. Make maximum use of available cover. Establish 360 degree security and dominate the area. Scan close in and away from your position. Most likely, the enemy is watching and waiting to make his move. Randomly check people leaving the area to deter attacks. Establish obstacles to control approaches to security positions. Insurgents may try to attack local security forces using a VBIED.

**Control.** Control the site until EOD arrives. Clear and set up an entry control point for first responders. Do not let others go forward to “inspect” the IED. Make contingency plans in case you are attacked by small arms or rocket propelled grenades (RPGs).

Should you be part of a patrol or convoy that finds an IED, the five "Cs" will help to ensure that the situation can be dealt with quickly and safely. Remember, an IED that is found is still an IED attack. By finding the IED, you have just disrupted the enemy's attack.

Do not forget about the enemy's other forms of attack, RPGs, small arms fire, mortars, and secondary IED. Enemy IED site = Enemy ambush site. You are in the kill zone!

### **Suspected IED—What Not To Do**

**Never approach a suspected IED.** Instead, use standoff optics like binoculars and spotting scopes from multiple angles to attempt to confirm the presence of an IED. When in doubt, back off and call EOD.

**Do not pick up det cord.** Det cord is an **explosive** and the presence of it alone is enough to call EOD. As for tracing and pulling on it...well, ask the Soldier that lost all his fingers on one hand when the det cord he was tracing exploded.

**Tracing command wire (CW).** The enemy has placed trip wires and other IEDs under/in the vicinity of command wires. When a command wire is located, rather than walking parallel to the wire or over the wire to locate the initiation point, work in a “S” pattern, crossing the CW until the initiation point is located.

**CAUTION! There has been at least one occasion where an IED was located at the initiation point, in addition to the IED at the main supply route (MSR).**

**Do not focus on the “found” IED.** An IED, once found, is not going to move. Look for additional devices. Look for the trigger man. Look for anyone trying to escape the area. Watch for approaching VBIEDs. Scan for enemy moving into position to engage you with small arms or RPGs. Focus outward.

Again, once positive IED indicators are found (det cord, wires, etc.), immediately move a safe distance away; perform a search of your safe area (5 and 25 meters) for secondary devices, and call EOD.

### **Actions After IED Detonation**

#### **Key points:**

- Quick, lethal and aggressive response in accordance with rules of engagement (ROE)
- Move out of kill zone
- Search for/Clear additional IEDs (5 and 25)
  - At the new location (5 and 25)
  - At the location where the vehicle is disabled (5 and 25)
- Treat/Evacuate casualties
- Report situation
- Expect follow on attacks

The 5 "Cs" are still applicable; however, you must now incorporate your counter ambush TTP.

Even when you do everything right tactically, the enemy can sometimes surprise you. For this reason, it is important to review some tactical principles for post-explosion actions. Units should be proficient in actions on contact, and team members should be cross-trained on other patrol member's duties. Remember, an IED attack is an ambush. It is important to note that the results of an IED attack can range from catastrophic to no damage at all. The enemy is not always successful with IED attacks. If you are attacked, your reaction to contact drills will have to be modified based upon vehicle damage and casualties.

Immediately scan outward. The biggest mistake Soldiers make is focusing inwards toward the site of the IED detonation and forgetting about the enemy. Obviously, some Soldiers will have to assess the situation, communicate with higher, tend to wounded, and recover vehicles. Every other patrol or convoy member should scan around the location for the enemy.

Look for enemy personnel or associated activities. If detected, engage the enemy under the ROE or attempt to detain them. Anyone fleeing the area with or without weapons should be considered suspect. A vehicle, such as a sedan or a motorcycle, rapidly departing the area may have enemy inside. Personnel found with commonly-used detonation devices, like cordless phones, key fobs, or radios should

be tested for explosive residue. Patrols can use testing kits to check for the presence of bomb-making chemicals or gunpowder on individuals.

Soldiers should have clear instructions on dealing with civilian crowds. After an attack, a crowd may begin to gather. This will only become worse the longer your unit remains at the site of an attack. Soldiers should have clear instructions on how to deal with looters. Deadly force usually is not an option, so alternate techniques should be discussed and practiced beforehand.

Media may show up at a scene; it is important to know how your ROE and command guidance applies to their presence.



## Chapter 7

### Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Hunting

#### IED Hunting

IED hunting requires patience, practice, and proactive approaches to the mission. IED hunters do much more than drive up and down the roads looking for IED signs. Patrol members clear routes to ensure freedom of movement for coalition forces (CF) and civilian traffic. Familiarity with the area to be cleared is one key element in successful IED hunting teams. Looking at the route from the enemy's perspective is a second critical element. Teams must use all means available to find IEDs and to prevent themselves from becoming a target.

#### Key points:

- In depth knowledge of the area
- Concentrate efforts on high threat areas
- Clear the route often
- Use combination of mounted/dismounted teams
- Move slow enough to observe
- Observe from multiple angles
- Investigate every clue that tends to point to an IED
- Take size of object into consideration
- Look for other IED indicators
- Use optics to maximize standoff
- Elicit information from Iraqi citizens



**Figure 7-1: IED hunting team**



**Figure 7-2: IED hunting vehicles**

Some route clearance teams have specialized equipment, like the Buffalo, Husky, or Meerkat vehicles. On the other hand, many IED hunting teams use simple equipment to observe changes in their assigned area. Binoculars, spotting scopes, white searchlights, and thermal sights can assist IED hunters.

The single most important consideration for IED hunting teams is to vary their actions. As has been said several times, do not let your searches become predictable. Searches should appear completely random to outside observers. Anyone watching the patrol should never know what is coming next. IED hunters use many techniques to throw off enemy observers. Teams start their daily searches at a different point each time they clear a route. Patrols use a different road to get to their assigned route each time. Teams can search a short stretch of road, then pick up and move the search to an area several kilometers away. While searching, units can move against traffic on the wrong side of the road, or they might search several hundred meters and then make a U-turn. Patrols may drive up an entrance ramp the wrong direction. One engineer unit changed the composition of the patrol each time it departed the base camp. A route clearing IED patrol might have up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) one day and a mix of up-armored HMMWVs and M113s the next day.

**Technique:** Instead of starting at one end of a route and driving to the other, consider patrolling one section and then reversing the patrol. Move to another entry point for the route and patrol the opposite direction towards the turnaround point.

Based upon previous teams' experiences, a few key principles for IED hunters have emerged. While the equipment and enemy may vary, these guidelines can help organize counter IED patrols.

- Use every tool you have. Review daily intelligence reports and debriefs from previous patrols.
- Use the same personnel consistently. This is one point where you want to set a pattern. Soldiers who are familiar with a route will know when changes have taken place. They will know what the roads and trails look like and what garbage and dirt piles are new. They will also be able to detect changes in the population's attitudes and presence.
- Drive at slow speeds and use the center of the road. You must drive slow enough to detect IED indicators. While convoys and other movements should go as fast as practical, IED hunters should move slowly and deliberately while searching. Moving in the center of the road gets the team further away from IEDs in the event of a detonation.
- Solicit information. Ask locals if they have seen unusual activity (you will need an interpreter).
- Investigate anything that looks out of the ordinary. Consider any item suspect if it is new, recently disturbed, or out-of-place. Look closely for other IED indicators such as wires or detonating (det) cord.



**Figure 7-3: Using optics to investigate a potential IED.**



**Figure 7-4: This IED hunting patrol has just located a suspicious section of curb at the site of a previous IED attack. It has halted to check the area with optics from several vantage points. The patrol confirmed an IED and called explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) to dispose of the device.**

- Do not pick anything up. All of the good souvenirs were picked up long ago by other Soldiers or local people. Something left on the ground that appears valuable most likely was placed there deliberately.
- Successful teams look at their route from the enemy's perspective. Remember, the enemy is trying to conceal the device from someone traveling on the route. IED hunting teams that look at the route from potential enemy observation points often find signs of IED preparations. Insurgents can get careless once they get out of sight of the main route, and they may leave wires, camouflage, or even the IED itself in plain sight. Offset teams searching parallel to the protected route can observe these indicators.



**Figure 7-5: Mounted patrol clearing route**

### **IED Hunting Patrol Organization**

Task organization for IED hunting can be as simple as using a combat patrol comprised of four armored HMMWVs to augment patrols incorporating dismounted Soldiers, dogs, metal detectors, and Husky and Buffalo vehicles. The task organization you choose will be dependent on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). If you must clear a 60 kilometer stretch of a main supply route (MSR) daily, a dismounted patrol will not work; however, if you are clearing a danger area that is two kilometers long, you may find the best way to get it cleared is via dismounts. In all IED hunting patrols there will be times where you must dismount to clear a threat (culvert or bridge as an example). Using dismounts in conjunction with mounted patrols has proven to be an effective technique in theater for some routes. Again, METT-TC will drive what organization to use.



Figure 7-6: Dismounted patrol with detection capability




Figure 7-7: Example IED hunting formation, mounted and dismounted formation




Figure 7-8: Example IED hunting formation, mounted and dismounted element




Figure 7-9: Example IED hunting formation, mounted and dismounted element.



## Chapter 8

### Cache Hunting

The enemy will place caches near locations where the enemy has used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) frequently. The removal of the caches forces the enemy to expose himself to coalition force (CF) targeting while trying to move IED materials. Just like all military forces, the enemy selects cache locations based on a linear/key terrain feature that provides a marker point leading to an area offering concealment from the enemy. These locations are normally found near a road that the enemy can access with a vehicle. Frequently the selected road is near an intersection to afford the enemy multiple entry/exit directions.



Figure 8-1: Searching for caches



**Figure 8-2: Mortar cache**

### **Enemy Cache Marking Techniques**

The enemy have placed caches and used markers adjacent to roads to identify where the cache is located. The marker is lined up with a predominate feature/tree to assist in finding the cache.



**Figure 8-3: Potential cache location**




Figure 8-4



Figure 8-5: Potential cache location



**Figure 8-6: A bomb maker's toolkit**

## **Chapter 9**

### **Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Common Sense**

Have you noticed that most of the things that keep you alive are pretty basic?

Coalition forces have armored vehicles that are unrivaled by any of the opponents that we face today. When you add the ingredient of the finest Soldiers on earth, you have a pretty good combination. Soldiers who man these vehicles rightly take a great deal of pride in what they do. The problem comes when they start to get over confident because of a belief that the vehicle they are in is invulnerable. Every Soldier, whether in theater or preparing to deploy, needs to be aware of the fact that there is no piece of equipment that can make you 100% impervious to an IED. The enemy has demonstrated their willingness to go to any lengths necessary in order to kill tanks and other pieces of armor. One of the best things a Soldier can do to help the enemy is to get careless because of a feeling that “the bad guy can’t hurt me.” There are few things more tragic than having to respond to the scene of a catastrophic IED strike. Do not allow yourself or your Soldiers to become victims because of a false sense of security.

Simple things like paying attention, not getting complacent, and not setting patterns will raise your survivability. Unfortunately, these are also some of the toughest things to do.

Do not allow yourself to become complacent. The IED field team constantly visits the scene of catastrophic IED incidents. Occasionally, we find that complacency has contributed to the deaths of Soldiers. If you want to go home tomorrow, complacency is not an option today.

Setting patterns is a perfect example. Habits are acceptable when life is routine, but no day in a combat zone is routine. We all know that setting patterns can get us hurt, yet we all tend to do it. Sometimes setting a pattern cannot be helped; there are only a certain number of roads in a given area and only a certain number of hours in the day. There are times, however, when the only thing that keeps us from setting a pattern is our vigilance. Examine your own operations every day and ask yourself, “What can we do differently tomorrow?”

Hold honest, critical after action reviews (AARs) following your missions. If you are preparing to deploy, get in the habit now of critiquing each and every training event. Allow every Soldier to speak in the AAR. Doing so keeps them alert and involved in the mission.

If you are preparing to deploy, practice, practice, and practice. Rehearse contingencies. Develop new ones. Hold competitions to see who can change high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) tires the quickest. Cross-train Soldiers on each others’ duties. Contact your local explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team and have them describe their procedures. Find out how you can assist them by securing an IED site. Learn everything you can about IEDs now.



## Appendix: Sample Tactical Standing Operating Procedure (TACSOP) Pre-combat Checklists

### Pre-Combat Checks (PCC)

#### Leader checklist:

- Determine the composition of your movement element.
  - What is your security element?
  - How many vehicles do you have?
  - How many have crew-served weapons?
  - Do you have any civilian vehicles or vehicles from other units?
  - Did they participate in rehearsals? (If not, they will not go.)
- Did you receive a situation update from the higher headquarters (HQ)?
  - Do you know the specifics of your route?
  - Do you have a map with graphics?
  - Do you know the danger areas (areas where improvised explosive devices [IEDs]/ambushes have occurred in the past)?
  - Have you analyzed the likelihood of the different types of contact (visual; physical [direct fire]; indirect fire; obstacles; air craft; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear [CBRN]; electronic warfare; civilians; and media) and rehearsed actions against each of the types of contact multiple times?
- Have you allotted sufficient time to conduct detailed PCC and pre-combat inspections (PCI) for crews and individuals?
- Have you thought through the communications (commo) plan internal to your movement serial:
  - From your patrol to supporting fires or aviation support
  - From your patrol to the units/forward operating bases (FOBs) along your route (keyed by control measures: e.g, checkpoints or phase lines)
  - From your patrol to medical evacuation assets (secure and in the clear).
  - Are all radios on Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System Receiver (PLGR) time?
  - Do you need additional signals (pyrotechnics [pyro])?

## **CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED**

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- Have you inspected medical assets (combat lifesaver [CLS] bags, Soldiers kits, litters) and rehearsed loading litters?
  - Do you have a medic and know where he will be in the patrol?
  - Does everyone know?
  - Do you have any CLS qualified Soldiers in the patrol? Where are they?
  - Does everyone have a nine-line medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) card on the radio in the vehicle?
- Have you thoroughly briefed the rear gunner?
  - Does he understand when to employ non-lethal or lethal measures?
- Does every vehicle know how to react to a possible vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) entering the side of the patrol?
  - Do you plan to block side access roads as you move? How will you do this?
- Have you test fired your crew-served weapons?
  - Are all gunners qualified on their weapon system?
  - Have you mounted and checked night vision devices (NVDs) and each weapon (individual and crew-served)?
  - Does everyone understand the weapon control status?
  - Does everyone understand the rules of engagement (ROE)?
  - Do you have enough ammunition (ammo) in a ready to fire configuration?
- Do you know how to contact and how long it will take quick reaction force (QRF) or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) to reach you at locations along your routes?
- Have you considered and rehearsed how you will handle civilian casualties, vehicle breakdowns, vehicles damaged/destroyed, the use of rally points, personnel bump plans, securing sensitive items, and accidents?
- Does every Soldier and vehicle have assigned sectors to scan to ensure 360° security?
  - Do they know how they will adjust their sectors of a vehicle behind or in front of them to enable them to scan their assigned sector?

- Have you talked specifically about staying focused in assigned sectors and not focusing on a contact (e.g. maintaining 360° security is a priority)?
- Have you been briefed on previous patrol routes and after action review (AAR) comments to enable a clearer picture of the situation?

**Individual checklist:**

- Weapon: Weapon cleaned, function tested, and appropriately lubed and test fired? Are close combat optics (CCOs), tactical light, advanced combat optical gunsight (ACOG), etc. mounted and zeroed?
- Ammunition and magazines: Magazines serviceable and ammunition loaded and stowed correctly (opening down/rounds out)? Do you have a complete basic load with initial amount in “ready to fire” configuration?
- Kevlar: Chin strap serviceable?
- Body armor: Plates properly installed and worn?
- Notebook and writing device?
- Wearing eye protection goggles? Clear lenses installed?
- Load bearing equipment (LBE) with two canteens (topped off) or CamelBak?
- Individual first aid kit?
- Flashlight with extra batteries and bulb?
- Identification tags (ID) tags?
- Military ID card?
- Civilian/Military drivers licenses?
- CLS kit and \_\_\_ intravenous (IV) bags x type \_\_\_\_ (check expiration dates)?
- Night vision goggles (NVGs) with batteries and tied down? Does the platoon sergeant (PSG) have the serial # on his card? Are batteries good?
- Operator's vehicle maintenance (OVM) keys? (OVM should not be locked.)
- Checkbook/Cash?
- Flex cuffs?
- Attended patrol brief?
- Conducted rehearsals for all anticipated forms of contact?

## **CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED**

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- Pro-mask?
- Glint tape?
- Watch?
- Crew-served weapon cleaned, test fired, NVG mounted and checked?  
Spare barrel bag (complete) present?

### **Ruck sack/A-bag (as needed for mission and what is the standing operating procedure [SOP] for packing):**

- Sleeping bag?
- 1 set desert camouflage uniform (DCU)?
- 2 T-shirts?
- 2 pair underwear?
- 2 pair socks (black/green)?
- 1 towel?
- 1 wash cloth?
- 1 sun screen/Chap Stick?
- Personal hygiene kit?
- Joint service lightweight integrated suit technology (JLIST) gear complete?
- Wet weather gear?
- Meals ready to eat (MRE) \_\_\_ each?
- Work coveralls?
- Work gloves?
- Gore-Tex top/bottom (cold weather)?
- Polypro top/bottom (cold weather)?
- Cold weather gloves?
- Weapons cleaning kit with cleaner, lubricant, preservative (CLP)?

### **Vehicle checklist:**

- Completed 5988E (before preventative maintenance checks and services [PMCS])? Are there any issues yet to be resolved?

- Current vehicle dispatch (Check expiration date)?
- Fuel/Fluid levels topped off?
- Additional package products (Class III) cross leveled throughout serial?
- VS-17 panel?
- Extra fuel can topped off and secured (internally)?
- Class I basic load (\_\_\_ MRE/\_\_\_ water)?
- Communication check of all available systems ? What are the ranges?
- Does vehicle have all required signal devices (e.g. Star clusters)?
- Basic issue item (BII) complete?
- Execution matrix (pp 1 and 2)?
- Tow bar if specified?
- Cargo secured in accordance with (IAW) guidance/technical manual (TM) ? No cargo, required devices serviceable/on-hand?
- Road guard belt?
- Flashlight with extra batteries and bulb?
- Map/Strip maps with fires overlay, obstacles (IED past/possible sites), routes (alternate/primary), boundaries, and/or check points?
- Warning triangles?
- Fire extinguisher (charged)?
- Emergency call signs and frequencies (freqs) posted near each radio? Can operator change freqs? Does operator know freqs (EOD, adjacent units, MEDEVAC, fires) in clear and cypher text mode?
- MEDEVAC nine-line format posted near each radio?
- Windows and mirrors cleaned?
- Turn signals and lights serviceable/functioning?
- Issued pyrotechnics?
- Litter strapped to brush guard (high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle [HMMWV]) or laid in bed (cargo vehicle)?
- PLGR with spare battery?
- Chem lights?

- Spare tire?
- Tow straps?
- Bolt cutter?
- Spot light?
- Extra batteries?
- Power AMP properly connected?
- CLS bag?
- Battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR) kit?
- Strobe light?
- Fuel cans?
- Water?
- Breach kit?
- Smoke grenades (colored)?
- Flares (Star cluster)?
- Thermite grenade?
- Hooligan tool?

**Pre-Combat Inspections (PCI)**

**Soldier knowledge:**

- Show me the route on your map?
- What are the rally points?
- What is the linkup plan if the convoy is separated?
- What is the traveling speed of the convoy?
- What is the catch-up speed of the convoy?
- What is your sector of fire?
- What is the sector of fire for your vehicle?
- If your vehicle breaks down, what vehicle is responsible for recovering it? What are the procedures?
- If your vehicle breaks down, what vehicle will you ride in?

- Show me the procedures for zeroing out every piece of comms equipment in your vehicle?
- If the convoy is ambushed from the front, what is the action of your vehicle?
- If the convoy is ambushed from the rear, what is the action of your vehicle?
- If there is an IED attack during the convoy, what is the action of your vehicle?
- If a suspicious vehicle approaches the convoy, what action can you take to prevent it from getting into your safety zone?
- At what point are you free to engage a vehicle that is approaching the convoy?
- What are some indicators that an IED has been emplaced along the route?
- What has been the enemy activity along our route over the last month, week?
- What is the commander's intent for this operation?
- What are the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) for this operation?
- Show me the logistics (LOG) patrol operation vehicle packet for your vehicle?
- What is the number of vehicles in this patrol?
- What is the number of people in this patrol?
- Describe the action of your vehicle as it approaches an overpass?
- Describe the action of your vehicle as it approaches a traffic circle?
- In a crowded area, what precaution are you going to take to safeguard your vehicle and weapon?
- Have you conducted headspace and timing checks for this .50 cal.? Where is the extra ammo? Have you rehearsed re-loading? Have you checked the NVD for this weapon?
- What is the frequency for this patrol?
- What is the frequency for higher HQ?
- How do you contact the QRF?
- What is the weapon control status? What is the ROE?
- Where are the indirect fire targets located along our route?

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- What is the breaching plan for any obstacles we encounter?
- Have you received a situation update on the recent activities along our route?

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**BCTP Bulletins, CTC Bulletins, Newsletters, and Trends Products:** These products are periodic publications that provide current lessons learned/TTP and information from the training centers.

**Special Editions:** Special Editions are newsletters related to a specific operation or exercise. Special Editions are normally available prior to a deployment and targeted for only those units deploying to a particular theater or preparing to deploy to the theater.

**News From the Front:** This product contains information and lessons on exercises, real-world events, and subjects that inform and educate Soldiers and leaders. It provides an opportunity for units and Soldiers to learn from each other by sharing information and lessons. *News From the Front* can be accessed from the CALL Web site.

**Training Techniques:** Accessed from the CALL products page, this on-line publication focuses on articles that primarily provide tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) at the brigade and below level of warfare.

**Handbooks:** Handbooks are "how to" manuals on specific subjects such as rehearsals, inactivation, and convoy operations.

**Initial Impressions Reports:** Initial impression reports are developed during and immediately after a real-world operation and disseminated in the shortest time possible for the follow-on units to use in educating personnel and supporting training prior to deployment to a theater. Products that focus on training activities may also be provided to support the follow-on unit.



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# Center For Army Lessons Learned



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